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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
to some degree. Where the facts are identical with those of the Connors
case (dismissal before opening statement), the rule contended for by
the dissent could probably be applied without prejudice to the defend-
ant. At the opening-statement stage, the defendant reveals the theory
of his case. Past this point, any dismissal by the court will usually
prejudice the defendant's conduct of his defense in the second action
because the prosecution will be able to prepare its case to meet the
defense."3
The court did not explicitly consider or discuss these matters in the
Connors opinion. Such considerations appear to be material for they
furnish a rational basis for the application of the rule of Connors to
other fact situations where dismissal might prejudice a defendant be-
cause trial courts will be discouraged from participating in the conduct
of a trial in an adversary role. On the other hand, the Connors decision
will tend to discourage the trial court from ordering dismissals which,
in fact, would be in the interests of justice. It is suggested that the
court might have been more precise and should have framed a rule
giving further recognition and consideration to the policy arguments,
thereby giving the trial courts guidelines within which to resolve the
dilemma (between the statutory rules and the Connors decision).
DAVID W. SANDELL
Insanity Defense to First Degree Murder Charge-M'Naghten
Reaffirmed. Don Anthony White, a Negro in his mid-twenties, was
convicted of first degree murder by a King County jury. In State v.
White,1 the Washington Supreme Court (three judges dissenting) af-
firmed the conviction and sentence which directed that the death pen-
alty be imposed.
At trial, the defendant admitted beating the deceased woman in the
laundry room of the Yesler housing project on the morning of Decem-
ber 24, 1959. It was established that she died as a result of this beat-
ing. The accused defended on the basis of mental irresponsibility.2
The evidence established that defendant White had never seen or
known of the victim prior to the fatal beating. An exhaustive presenta-
33 Note that a rule to the effect that a dismissal will bar a second action only if the
defense has made its opening statement would force defense counsel to make an opening
statement in every case, thus further implicating the court in trial tactics.
1 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 374 P2d 942 (1962).
2 RCW 10.76.010 provides: "Any person who shall have committed a crime while
insane, or in a condition of mental irresponsibility, and in whom such insanity or men-
tal irresponsibility continues to exist, shall be deemed criminally insane ...." RCW
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tion of White's life history was submitted showing a deprived environ-
mental background and an inability since childhood to control his
behavior or to conform to society's standards.' Two psychiatrists and
a psychologist testified on behalf of the defendant. This expert testi-
mony indicated that White (1) "had a psychotic schizophrenic reaction
which is chronic, recurrent, and episodic."4 (2) At the time of the
killing, White's contact with reality was non-existent; his knowledge
of right and wrong had no influence on his behavior, and he had no
power to resist emotional impulses.' The defendant's medical experts
declined to state whether White knew right from wrong at the time
the crime was committed.6
The state called a psychiatrist in rebuttal who testified that White
was a "sociopathic individual" but "was in a position to distinguish
between right and wrong, and therefore, in terms of the law, is respons-
ible for his action."7 The court instructed the jury not to interpret
the witness' reference to the right and wrong test as an authoritative
definition of the insanity test. The jury was instructed as follows:
If the defendant is to be acquitted upon his plea of mental irresponsi-
bility or insanity, he must convince you by a preponderance of the
evidence that, at the time the crime is alleged to have been committed,
his mind was diseased to such an extent that he was unable to perceive
the moral qualities of the act with which he is charged, and was unable
to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act
charged .... 8
The given instruction was based on the M'Naghten' test which does
not include a lack of volitional control in the criminal insanity defense.
On appeal the defendant assigned as error the failure of the court to
10.76.030 provides: "If the plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility be interposed . . *
the court shall instruct the jury . . . that in case a verdict of acquittal of the crime
charged be returned, they shall also return special verdicts finding . . . (2) whether
they acquit him because of his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of its
commission .... "
3 As early as 1951 when White was fourteen, there were indications of serious
psychological difficulties. A comprehensive psychiatric and psychological evaluation
of White at the Ryther Child Center indicated that the boy was in serious need of
treatment. The doctor making the report predicted that if White were not treated, he
would end up either in a mental institution or in prison. State v. White, 160 Wash.
Dec. 554, 583-84, 374 P.2d 942, 960 (1962).
4 Id. at 585, 374 P.2d at 961.
5 Ibid.
6 A psychiatrist's competence to answer this question is subject to considerable
doubt because psychiatry, being a science, does not purport to answer ethical questions
of "rightness or wrongness." See United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1961).
7 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 578, 374 P.2d 942, 957 (1962).
8 Id. at 581, 374 P.2d at 959.
9 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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instruct the jury in terms of section 4.01 of the American Law Insti-
tute's Model Penal Code. Under this standard the jury would have
been instructed:
[T]he defendant is not responsible for the crimes charged herein if at
the time of said crimes, as a result of mental disease or defect, he
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
act, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.'0 (Empha-
sis added.)
The instruction concerning the criteria for mental irresponsibility
was crucial because "there was substantial evidence from which the
jury could have found that appellant could not control his own be-
havior, even though, at the time, he knew the difference between right
and wrong.""
An intent on the part of the actor to commit the prohibited act is
an essential ingredient of most crimes. The presence of this mental
element necessarily implies that the actor have a capacity for conscious
awareness at the time the crime was committed. This basic mental
capacity plus the actual intent constitute the mens rea." The various
criteria which have been developed to determine what forms of mental
irresponsibility negate the requisite mens rea all assume some capacity
for conscious thought.3'
The M'Naghten rules represent the development of the common law
in this area at the middle of the nineteenth century. They originated
from questions put to the Judges of England in 1843 by the House of
Lords as a result of official concern over the acquittal, by reason of
insanity, of Daniel M'Naghten who had shot and killed Sir Robert
Peel's private secretary, the secretary being mistaken for Sir Robert.
In answer to the propounded questions, the judges answered:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
10 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 582, 374 P.2d 942, 959 (1962). The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a very similiar test in United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
11 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 583, 374 P2d 942, 960 (1962).
"2See generally, Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Hav. L. REv. 974 (1932).
's3The defense of "automatonism" may be available to exculpate a defendant who
is incapable of forming the requisite intent even though he might not fall under a
conventional insanity defense. In Regina v. Charlson, [1955] 1 All E.R. 859, an accused
charged with assault with intent to commit murder presented evidence tending to
show that he had a cerebral tumor and that a person in such condition is subject to
outbursts of impulsive violence which he is incapable of controlling. The jury was
instructed that if the defendant's actions were purely automatic and if he had no con-
trol over the movement of his limbs, he was not to be held criminally responsible. A
verdict of "not guilty" was returned.
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was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.14
The Washington court adopted the M'Naghten standard in 19091"
and applied it mechanically during the next forty-eight years without
considering the availability of a more suitable test. 6 The court early
determined that a defendant in Washington must establish his mental
irresponsibility by a preponderance of the evidence.' 7 The defendant
must show "that he was unable to perceive the moral qualities of the
act... and was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the
particular act charged... ."" (Emphasis added.) Thus, the view in
Washington is a stricter requirement than M'Naghten, which includes
the disjunctive "or," rather than the conjunctive "and."' 9
In 1909 the Washington legislature enacted a statute abolishing
the insanity defense in criminal trials. 2° The statute was struck down
by the court in State v. Strasburg" as depriving a defendant of liberty
without due process of law and being violative of a defendant's right
to trial by jury under the State constitution. The court indicated that:
the sanity of the accused, at the time of committing the act... [is]
as much a substantive fact, going to make up his guilt, as the fact of
his physical commission of the act .... [I]f he had no will to control
the physical act of his physical body, how can it in truth be said that
the act was his act.2
2
In 1947 the Washington court rejected a proposal to graft the "ir-
resistible impulse" defense onto the M'Naghten rules2" as has been
14 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).15 State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 Pac. 167 (1909).
16 M'Naghten was applied in the following cases with no attack made on the wisdom
of the test: State v. Cogswell, 54 Wn.2d 240, 339 P.2d 465 (1959) ; State v. Putzell,
40 Wn.2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952) ; State v. Rio, 38 Wn.2d 446, 230 P.2d 308 (1951) ;
State v. Odell, 38 Wn.2d 4, 227 P.2d 710 (1951) ; State v. Maish, 29 Wn.2d 52, 185
P.2d 486 (1947) ; State v. Davis, 6 Wn.2d 696, 108 P.2d 641 (1940) ; State v. Henke,
196 Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938) ; State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291 Pac. 1093(1930) ; State v. Schafer, 156 Wash. 240, 286 Pac. 833 (1930).17 State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98 (1904).
18 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 581, 374 P.2d 942, 959 (1962).
19 See People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936), holding that the
use of the conjunctive in instructing the jury on the insanity defense was reversible
error under the New York statute prescribing the disjunctive.
20 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, Ch. 249, § 7. "It shall be no defense to a person charged
with the commission of a crime, that at the time of its commission, he was unable by
reason of his insanity ... to comprehend the nature and quality of the act committed,
or to understand that it was wrong . . . nor shall any testimony or other proof thereof
be admitted in evidence."
21 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
22 Id. at 119, 110 Pac. at 1024.
23State v. Maish, 29 Wn.2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947).
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done in some jurisdictions.24 Under this defense a defendant might be
acquitted if his "reasoning powers were so far dethroned by his dis-
eased mental condition as to deprive him of the will power to resist
the insane impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing it to be
wrong."2 This test exculpates a defendant if he lacked the volitional
capacity to control his actions. The Washington court's reason for
rejecting the test rested upon the supposed difficulty of application
by a jury.
State v. Collins"0 represents the first serious attack on the M'Naghten
test in Washington. The assault was made on the basis of the now
famous Durham case decided in the District of Columbia in 1954.
With strong overtones of equating moral blame with criminal responsi-
bility to the exclusion of all other considerations, Durham adopted the
"product" test first applied in New Hampshire in 1870.28 The Durham
rule provides that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his un-
lawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." The
rule as subsequently applied in the District of Columbia is merely one
of causation in fact, the defendant being entitled to a verdict of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" if he would not have committed the of-
fense "but for" or "except for" the mental disease.30 In Collins, the
Washington court rejected this test, reasoning that it lacked standards
and would be difficult for a jury to apply. The court did, however,
express dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rules and announced that
"on the question of the existence of a better method to determine...
[criminal] intent than the right and wrong test, we have an open
mind."",
State v. White represents the next serious attempt to persuade the
Washington court to discard M!Naghten.
The Objective of Criminal Law. In the White case the court indi-
cated that "the basic purpose of the criminal law [is] to minimize
2 4 For a digest of mental irresponsibility criteria in all United States jurisdictions
including compilation of those jurisdictions which have adopted the "irresistible
impulse" defense, see WmHOFEN, MENTAL DisoER AS A CRImINAL DEFENSE 129-73
(1954).
25 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
2050 Wn.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957).27 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
28 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 339 (1870). It is of interest to note that the Washington
court considered and rejected the Pike rule in State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 Pac.
167 (1909).2 0 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
30 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
31 State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 754, 314 P2d 660, 668 (1957).
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crime in society." 2 The deterrent effect of penal sanctions is consid-
ered a valid and effective method of accomplishing this aim." The
court adopted a general statement by Professor Wechsler indicating
that:
The purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social condemna-
tion of forbidden conduct, buttressed by sanctions calculated to prevent
it . . . by their impact on the general imagination, i.e., through the
median of general deterrence. Considerations of equality and of ef-
fectiveness conspire to demand that sanctions which are threatened
generally be applied with generality upon conviction. . . . Responsi-
bility criteria define a broad exception. The theory of the exception
is that it is futile thus to threaten and condemn persons who through
no fault of their own are wholly beyond the range of influence of
threatened sanctions of this kind. So long as there is any chance that
the preventive influence may operate, it is essential to maintain the
threat. 3 4 (Emphasis added.)
The court thus announced its purpose as minimizing crime in society.
The approved method is through the deterrent effect of criminal sanc-
tions, but a "broad exception" to this method is recognized in those
situations where a person, because of his mental condition, is "wholly
beyond the range of threatened sanctions." The crucial issue becomes
one of selecting a test of mental responsibility best designed to imple-
ment the court's avowed purpose.
In Search of the Test for Mental Responsibility. The object of a
criminal proceeding is to affix guilt upon those who violate society's
criminal prohibitions. A major purpose of psychiatry is to rehabilitate
the mentally ill; "blame fixing" is not involved in the analysis. This
basic incompatibility in viewpoint makes it difficult to devise a test of
criminal responsibility which is compatible with the objective of penal
law and yet can utilize enlightened psychiatric opinion.
The M'Naghten rules have been widely criticized on the ground that
the test considers only the rational facet of the personality and does
not take into account the volitional and emotional aspects. Modern
psychiatry recognizes man as an integrated personality and regards as
unrealistic attempts to compartmentalize his faculties and consider
32 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 594, 374 P.2d 942, 966 (1962).
33 But see Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality? 43 J. CRUai. L.,
C. & P.S. 176 (1952) where the threat of detection is considered crucial.
34 Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374(1955).
35 HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 519 (2d ed. 1960).
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only certain facets.3" Given this view, psychiatrists complain that the
M'Naghten rules place them in a "strait jacket," the right-and-wrong
criteria not allowing them to testify within the realm of their
competence.
The accused's whole personality is relevant to the inquiry under the
Durham formula and thus unrestricted psychiatric testimony is ma-
terial. Implicit in this test however is the rejection of the deterrent
theory. Under Durham a defendant who, at the time the crime was
committed, had capacity for choice and control but nevertheless failed
to exercise that control might be exculpated if the act were found to
be a "product" of his mental disease. The Washington court has re-
jected Durham as being inconsistent with the desired policy of social
control.T
In the White case then, the court was confronted with the problem
of fashioning a test which would allow realistic psychiatric evaluation
to be considered; which would exculpate a defendant if his mental
condition rendered him beyond the reach of deterrence by criminal
sanctions; and which would allow the desired degree of "social con-
trol" consistent with the deterrent theory. At the outset the court
narrowed the choice to either the Model Penal Code test or its re-
stricted version of M'Naghten.
The M'Naghten test was reaffirmed in the White case. The court
concentrated on whether M'Naghten is adequate to further the desired
social objective, not whether the Model Penal Code test might be
better. By this analysis the court reached a result inconsistent with
its objective.
The court's only criticism of the Model Penal Code test was by
analogy to the "irresistible impulse" test (which also contains the
volitional element). The court stated that the "irresistible impulse"
test had been rejected in State v. Maish33 because of the extreme dif-
ficulty in application and that "with regard to capacity to control one's
behavior, it would appear that there is no more psychiatric certainty
today... ."" The court necessarily assumed that M'Naghten was
easier for a jury to apply. The validity of this assumption is far from
clear.
Psychiatric testimony concerning volitional capacity and the inte-
36 For judicial acceptance of this viewpoint see United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751 (3d Cir. 1961).
37 State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 314 P2d 660 (1957).
38 29 Wn2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947).
39 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 594, 374 P.2d 942, 966 (1962).
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gration of various aspects of an accused's personality is relevant under
the Model Penal Code test. It would seem under this standard that a
jury would have more pertinent and reliable information upon which
to base a decision than under the right-and-wrong criteria where the
competence of expert testimony is doubtful.
In reaching its result in the White case the court relied on the argu-
ment that the legislature "has established a policy in this state that
only the most extreme degree of insanity will relieve a defendant of
criminal liability."' The court found this legislative intent in the 1909
statute which the Strasburg case declared unconstitutional the follow-
ing year.41 The legislature has been silent on the subject ever since.
Under these facts, the court's discovery of a legislative policy to strictly
limit the insanity defense is of doubtful merit. The Washington statute
concerning the mental irresponsibility defense42 does not set out the
criteria for finding mental irresponsibility,43 and thus the test must be
provided by the judiciary. The court's reliance on this theory repre-
sents a regression from the Collins position that upon the discovery of
a more suitable insanity test it might be adopted.
The court further reasoned that:
M'Naghten is preferable to the... [Model Penal Code] test in that
the M'Naghten rule better serves the basic purpose of the criminal law
-to minimize crime in society... [A]ll who might possibly be de-
terred from the commission of criminal acts are included within the
sanctions of the criminal law.44 (Emphasis added.)
This position is patently inconsistent with the principle that "it is
futile.., to... condemn persons who ... are wholly beyond the range
of influence of threatened (criminal) sanctions.... ."" The result is
also inconsistent with the basic mens rea concept which "is based on
the assumption that a person has a capacity to control his behavior."46
The Washington court recognized that there can be no guilt with-
out the requisite mental capacity. It endorsed the idea that only those
having the mental capacity to be deterred by penal sanction ought to
be held responsible. And the court was fully aware that,
40 Id. at 591, 374 P.2d at 965.
41 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, Ch. 249, § 7.
42 RCW 10.76.010.
4 In some jurisdictions the standard is provided for by statute. E.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 1120 provides: "A person is not excused from criminal liability as an ...
insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal
act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as: 1. Not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, 2. Not to know that the act was wrong."
44 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 594, 374 P.2d 942, 966 (1962).
45 Id. at 593, 374 P.2d at 966.46 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Under the given instruction, the defense of not guilty by reason of
mental irresponsibility is not available to a person who has the ability
to understand the nature and quality of his acts, but, because of mental
disease or defect, is somehow unable to control his own behavior.4 7
Yet in implementing the "social control" policy by subjecting to
criminal sanctions all those who might possibly be deterred, an ac-
cused who is not in fact capable of being deterred may be convicted.
Conclusion. Under the Model Penal Code test an accused may be
found "not guilty by reason of mental irresponsibility" if "he lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his act, or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." It is submitted
that this test is more appropriate than the court's restricted view of the
M'Naghten rules to determine a defendant's mental responsibility.
By this standard the admission of complete psychiatric data is rele-
vant to the inquiry. It is consistent with the concept of mens rea
based on the assumption that a person has the basic capacity to control
his own behavior and to choose between alternatives. And it is con-
sistent with the policy of deterrence and social control which appears
to be paramount in the Washington court's analysis.
JOHN H. BiNNs JR.
Proximate Cause in Negligent Homicide. Defendant was charged
with negligent homicide under RCW 46.56.0401 for causing the death
of a pedestrian through the operation of a motor vehicle.' The trial
jury found the defendant guilty, but the trial judge entered an order
arresting judgment and, in the alternative, granting a new trial. From
this order the state appealed. In his trial memorandum, the judge
ruled as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to show any
causal relation between the defendant's state of intoxication and the
resulting death to a pedestrian. The Washington Supreme Court in
a 5-3 decision reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judg-
ment upon the verdict of the jury. The court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence for the jury to find that each element of the offense
charged had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
47 State v. White, 160 Wash. Dec. 554, 582, 374 P.2d 942, 959 (1962).
1RCW 46.56.040: "When the death of any person shall ensue within one year as a
proximate result of injury received by the operation of any vehicle by any person
while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor . .. the person so
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor
vehicle."
2 State v. Costello, 59 Wn2d 325, 367 P.2d 816 (1962).
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